

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSY NOMENCLATURE - EF DOOR LATCH TOOL
ASSY FZN. SED39118691-301

SYSTEM - ORBITER

REV 001

SUBSYSTEM - EVA EQUIPMENT

DATE 04/01/01

FMEA		NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF DESIGNATION	CRIT Y	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE LOCATION	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
REF	REV					
28		LATCH (1) SDD39118690-081	1/1	Mode: Shaft is in unengaged position Cause: • Contamination • Defective material	END ITEM Shaft will not rotate, cannot engage in manual override mechanism CREW VEHICLE Possible loss of crew vehicle. Door latches cannot be released, resulting in the inability to close ET doors	1. DESIGN FEATURES TO MINIMIZE FAILURE MODE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Constructed of high strength, 15-5 stainless steel b. Tolerances used on parts to minimize variability due to temperature extremes of reentry/entry. 2. TEST OR ANALYSIS TO DETECT FAILURE MODE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Acceptance</u> Functional Test: Complete functional testing to verify handle/leash assembly will turn smoothly, rotate smoothly, and release for storage. Handle and shaft are locked together when in the half extracted position, the shaft rotates and locks freely. b. <u>Qualification</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Qualification test consists of interfacing with at least one Orbiter, including one complete cycle (lock deployment and latch rearm) at both latch locations. (2) Cycleable - Subjected to 15 complete cycles as defined above by the definition of one cycle. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Allen Wrench - Fourteen complete revolutions resulting in maximum torque of 200 in-lbs. (b) External override force (shaft including latch engagement) (c) Ten complete revolutions of spider switch (3) Thermal qualification testing to verify the tool for a hot and temperature extremes of -200 F to +350 F. c. <u>Integrity</u> Complete functional testing will be performed once every year or after each 120 hours of use or after launch/reentry properly.

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ASSY NOMENCLATURE & DOCUMENTATION BOOK

SYSTEM OVERVIEW

M. V. JUNN

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FMEA		NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF/DESIGNATION	CRAFT	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
REF	REV						
28		LATCH {3} ----- SD039110690-001	1/1	Mode: Stuck in engaged position Cause: ▷ Contamination ▷ Defective material	SHUTTER Shaft will not stroke, cannot engage in manual override mechanism CREW VEHICLE Possible loss of crew/vehicle Door latches cannot be released, resulting in the inability to close E/T doors	3. INSPECTION a) Manufacturing (1) Quality Assurance verification of compliance for materials (requirements) (2) Verified conformance to drawing as built configuration (3) Visual inspection of tool for damage (4) Verified proper operation of tool (5) Functional test (PDA) performed (6) Verified visibly clean 4. TURNAROUND (1) Inspect for visible damage, contamination and clean according to PIA (2) Verify completion of functional test for reacceptance	
						4. FAILURE HISTORY None	04/02/16 ATTACHMENT Page 2 of 2 L1

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSY NOMENCLATURE: EVA DOOR LATCH TOOL

SYSTEM: ORBITER

Rev. 0000

ASSY P/N: SED39118690-001

SUBSYSTEM: EVA EQUIPMENT

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FMEA		NAME, QIV & DRAWING REF DESIGNATION	CRIT Y	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
REF	REV						
7B		LATCH (1) ----- SDD39118690-001	1/1	Mode: Stuck in engaged position Cause: a) Contamina- tion b) Defective material	END ITEM Shaft will not stroke, cannot engage in manual override Mechanism CREW VEHICLE Possible loss of crew/vehicle Due to latches cannot be released, resulting in the inability to close EVA doors	5. OPERATIONAL USE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Operational Effect of Failure: The EVA door tool cannot be used if the latch cannot be engaged. b. Crew Action: Force latches in with hammer or vice grips. c. Crew Training: None d. Mission Constraint: None identified e. In-Flight Checklist: Verify proper operation before translating to worksite 	

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ATTACHMENT
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